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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document aims to provide a detailed overview of the design for the
electronic voting system that is to be implemented by the University of Sur-
rey as part of the Trustworthy Voting Systems (TVS) Project. In addition
to the overview, the document aims to provide a record of the discussions
and thoughts that led to the final design.
1.2 Scope
The TVS project aims to design and implement an end-to-end verifiable
voting system that is practical to field in the real world. We will use current
UK electoral elections as a reference point to formulate our requirements
and goals and we are confident that our design decisions will be general
enough to cover practices specific to other countries.
2 Requirements
We give a summary of the various requirements of the voting system we
hope to build.
2.1 Implementation Requirements
• Familiar and Simple Voter Experience: The system should have
a simple and consistent user interface even though it is able to handle
different election election methods.
• Support First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) & Alternative Vote (AV):
The system should initially support both FPTP and AV elections with
the ability to extend to other election methods. A brief overview of
the FPTP and AV election methods is given in the Appendix. More
detailed information can be found in the various Surrey Technical Re-
ports.
• Focus on a single constituency with around 80,000 voters:
It is estimated that there are no more than 80,000 eligible voters per
constituency in the UK. We believe that aiming to implement a system
that can cater to this top-end figure will be a good target to aim for.
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• Multiple channels for vote casting: The system should provide
multiple channels for vote casting, e.g. paper ballot and touch screen.
• No special equipment: The system should not rely on special pur-
pose hardware or software.
• Complete ballot generation phase in 72 hours: Election dates
are sometimes announced just one week before the election. Hence,
the system should take no more than 72 hours to setup the election
and generate all the ballots.
• Complete ballot tallying phase in 8 hours: The system should
take no-more than 8 hours to tally the elections in the worst case and
significantly less on average. For example, in the current UK general
elections, the tallying phase begins at 10pm and the election results
are normally announced before 6am the following day.
• Auditing of the ballot tallying phase in 72 hours: The sys-
tem should provide auditability of the ballots and verifiability of the
election as a whole. These audits should not take more than 72 hours.
• Data size: It should be possible to contain all vote information in a
single DVD (4.7GB) and all the audit information in a single blue-ray
disk (25GB).
2.2 Security Requirements
• Voter Privacy One of the principles of modern elections is the ‘secret
ballot’, whereby it should not be visible externally how any particular
voter voted. This property may be considered in terms of anonymity
or secrecy. Roughly:
– anonymity requires that for any particular vote, it is not known
which voter cast that vote.
– vote secrecy requires that for any particular voter, the vote that
they have cast is not known.
These are useful informal definitions, though they will not cover cor-
ner cases such as a unanimous election, in which it is trivially known
how everyone voted. A more precise definition [15] of the anonymity
property is:
– Let A1 and A2 be any two voters, and v1 and v2 be any two
votes. No one should be able to distinguish between a case where
A1 casts v1 and A2 casts v2, and a case where A1 casts v2 and
A2 casts v1.
6
Project Reference: Trustworthy Voting Systems TVS-SUR-TR-05
Anonymity and vote secrecy both require that there is no externally
observable link between a voter and the vote that they have cast.
Anonymity comes from the point of view of the vote, and secrecy from
the point of view of the voter.
• Receipt Freeness This is the requirement that voters should not be
able to prove to a third party how they voted. In other words, voters
should not have, or be able to generate, evidence of how they voted.
• Election Integrity Integrity in the context of an election system is
the property that the result of the election is not manipulated or al-
tered in any way. This means that all the steps involved in processing
the votes preserve the information that they are processing. In partic-
ular, steps that transform the representation of the vote do not alter
the vote itself.
The election process may be considered in three stages: casting the
vote, recording the vote, and then tallying the votes. Integrity will
require that each of these stages is honest. These requirements are
respectively termed:
– cast as intended, meaning that the vote captured by the system
(on a ballot form, touch screen, optical scan, lever system, or
any other method provided to the voter to cast her vote) should
correspond to the vote that the voter intended to cast. This is
not a security property as such, but it is a usability requirement
and one that is necessary to justify the claim that the outcome
of the election reflects the will of the voters;
– recorded as cast, meaning that the vote data to be processed by
the system correspond to the votes that were cast by the voters.
We take this to encompass the requirement that the voter’s choice
is correctly encoded in any receipt;
– counted as recorded, meaning that the process of tallying the votes
gives the result corresponding to the votes that were recorded.
• Verifiability This is the property that the result of the election, and
the processing of the votes, can be publicly verified or audited after
the election has taken place.
– individual verifiability refers to the ability of individual voters
to confirm that their choice has been correctly encoded in their
receipt.
– public verifiability means that anyone can verify that the receipts
posted to the Bulletin Board have been correctly decrypted and
tallied.
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– end-to-end verifiability means that all the stages of the election,
from the casting of the vote, through to the tallying of all the
votes, can be verified and that the declared election result really
is the correct tally of all the votes that were cast. End-to-end
verifiability can be public or individual, or a combination of the
two (where individuals verify some aspects, and public auditors
verify other aspects).
This form of verifiability is concerned with auditing the election data.
Verifiability therefore requires that this data is published during or
after the election, to enable the checks to take place. It is not concerned
with the reliability or verification of the election machinery itself, since
its correct operation is checked through verifying the published election
data. Thus, concerns about tampering with or replacing equipment
are addressed. The claim that integrity of the election was upheld
becomes a mathematical theorem concerning the publicly available
data.
• Robustness This is concerned with resilience in the face of random
faults as well as deliberate attempts to disrupt the election, such as
denial of service attacks. One aspect of this is an ability to recover
from cheating when it is detected. Another aspect is the ability to
run the election even in the face of a minority of dishonest election
authorities, for example tellers refusing to decrypt ciphertexts, or mix
servers failing to operate.
3 System Overview
3.1 Preˆt a` Voter Ballot Form
We suggest the use of Preˆt a` Voter style ballot forms. Firstly, it is simple
and very similar to the current ballots used in UK elections that voters are
already familiar with. A Preˆt a` Voter ballot, as shown in Figure 1, consists
of a detachable list of candidate names, usually the left-hand half of the
ballot, given in a random order, and corresponding boxes on the right-hand
side into which the voter’s preference are recorded. This right-hand half also
contains encrypted information that enables the system to reconstruct the
candidate order, but encrypted in such a way that no single party is able to
perform this action on its own.
For historical reasons this encrypted information is called an ‘onion’ as the
early proposals for Preˆt a` Voter [21, 5] built up the encrypted information
in a series of layers, so the layers could be ‘peeled’ off one at a time at the
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decryption stage. However, the terminology now commonly applies to any
encrypted information associated with a candidate ordering used in this way.
Figure 1: A ballot form example
3.2 Vote Casting
The voter casts a vote by filling in the boxes on the right-hand side of the
ballot form, corresponding to the chosen names. If a single name is to be
chosen, an ‘×’, tick or other mark is placed against the name. If a preference
list of names is to be chosen, then the appropriate preferences are placed
against the chosen names in the conventional way. This is illustrated in
Figure 2.
The two halves of the ballot form are then separated, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 3. The left-hand half, consisting of the list of candidates, is destroyed.
Its destruction is necessary to ensure that the voter cannot later prove how
she voted, and hence provides resistance to coercion and vote-selling. The
local officials must enforce the destruction of the left-hand side as part of the
voting process. The right-hand half of the ballot form, pictured in Figure 3,
is scanned into the system.
Figure 2: Completing the ballot. (a) Single cross. (b) Preference list
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3.3 Vote Capture
The voter brings the right-hand side to the local officials and it is scanned at
the voting booth. Note that the random candidate ordering provides voter
privacy. As the left-hand side is detached and destroyed before the vote is
scanned, no-one (including the scanner in the booth) will know the voter’s
preferences.
The scanning process retrieves the serial number (which is generated as a
cryptographic hash of the bulletin board data corresponding to that partic-
ular ballot) and the voter’s choice information and posts this information to
the BB. The BB signs this data and sends this signed information back to
the booth. The signature is now printed on the right-hand column and the
voter retains the right-hand side (or a copy) as a receipt.
The encrypted vote (that is, the right-hand side) is published to the BB so
that anyone in possession of a copy of the receipt can check that it appears
on the bulletin board unaltered, without revealing the voter’s choices. In
case the BB does not reflect the right-hand side information correctly, the
receipt can be used to file a complaint.
It is important that the receipt is signed by the system to prevent a malicious
voter from presenting a faked receipt to discredit the elections. It is also
important for the voter to retain the signed receipt and helper organisations
[2] in the polling station should be available to help the voter check that
the signature on her receipt is valid before leaving the polling station. This
provides protection against the system attempting to discredit voters by
providing false signatures. In the event that the BB is off-line, the signature
of the local polling booth is applied to the receipt and encrypted votes are
forwarded to the BB when communication is reestablished.
Figure 3: The vote. (a) Single cross. (b) Preference list
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3.4 Ballot Auditing
Auditing a ballot form involves decryption of the onions by the tellers to
reveal the plaintexts, thereby reconstructing the candidate ordering and
verifying that the candidate ordering printed on the ballot corresponds to
the information encrypted in the onions.
Auditing Authorities can select random ballots for auditing, before, during
and after the election. In addition, voters at the polling booth may wish to
perform their own checks on the ballot forms. Voters may elect to audit a
number of ballot forms before choosing one to cast their vote.
3.5 Receipt Checking
When a vote is cast, the ballot serial number and the right-hand side infor-
mation corresponding to the voters mark are scanned and published onto the
bulletin board. The voter takes away the right-hand side as a receipt and the
voter herself, or Helper Organisations acting on her behalf, can check that
the information on their receipt appears on the board. This will give them
the assurance that their vote was indeed correctly registered and will be cor-
rectly incorporated into the tally. If their vote does not appear on the board,
or appears incorrectly, then they can use their receipt to lodge a complaint.
Voters are expected to retain their receipts as a protection against their vote
being changed. A human readable paper audit trail [16], or voter-verifiable
paper audit trail [17] can also be used to provide additional assurance.
3.6 Vote Processing
During the vote processing stage, the ciphertext components on the BB
corresponding to the voters choices are extracted to initiate the tallying
phase. The essential idea behind the vote processing phase is to transform
the set of encrypted votes into a set of plaintext votes, but without allowing
anyone (including those involved in the decryption) to perform end-to-end
matching.
The mixnet is a tool introduced by David Chaum [6], and it is used in many
electronic voting systems. In general a set of encrypted votes are passed
between a set of mix servers and shuﬄed in secret one or more times by
each party. At each stage, the set of encrypted votes are made to look
different to hide the input/output relationship. Of course, this must be
done in a verifiable manner and both the shuﬄe and transformation must
be verified using one of several methods. At the end of the mixing phase,
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the encrypted votes are finally output for tallying and the results can be
posted back to the bulletin board. The details of the tallying will depend
on the election method (FPTP or AV in our case)
We note that it is also possible to use homomorphic techniques for tallying
instead of the mixnet based approach. This was done for example in Scratch
& Vote [1], which uses Preˆt a` Voter ballots but with homomorphic tabu-
lation. However, there are a number of difficulties with the homomorphic
tabulation approach despite its apparently simpler design. Each encryption
in a homomorphic encryption based system must be accompanied by a proof
that the encryption corresponds to a valid counter. As encrypted votes are
accumulated into a counter before being decrypted to reveal the final tally,
even a single rogue counter that escapes checks can corrupt the integrity of
the entire result. In addition, homomorphic encryption schemes like Paillier
and the Generalized Paillier scheme are significantly more computationally
intensive for similar security levels, compared to the El-Gamal scheme. We
discuss this further in Section 5.
4 Front-end
4.1 Paper Based Front-end
One of the fundamentals concepts behind Preˆt a` Voter has been the per-
forated ballot paper that allows for the destruction of the left-hand side,
containing the candidate names. This destruction of the candidate list con-
tributes to the overall security properties provided by Preˆt a` Voter. The
ability to scan and interpret the voters’ choice without the machine learn-
ing how that voter has voted is essential in maintaining privacy. We have
considered alternative interfaces, some of which we will discuss later in Sec-
tion 4.2, but we still believe a paper based front-end should be provided
as an option. One of the advantages of a paper based front-end is that it
is familiar to the public and the actual voting procedure does not change
that much. However, the paper approach does present some problems. It
is often seen as out-dated and not in keeping with a new election system
??. There are also robustness issues when trying to accurately interpret
human handwriting. These issues would be compounded when in ranked
elections, where the system is not just detecting the presence of the an ‘×’,
but interpreting handwritten numbers. One of the biggest disadvantages of
a paper based system is a lack of accessibility features. A report from Scope
and Sense [23], both disability charity groups, states that any new election
system in the UK will have to demonstrate how it plans on complying with
accessibility requirements . This indicates that having a solely paper based
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front-end will not satisfy these requirements and an alternative vote casting
method will be required. However, that does not necessarily mean aban-
doning paper altogether. A paper interface might provide the best interface
for a significant portion of the electorate, and a greater level of privacy. As
such we intend on pursuing a paper based front-end whilst being aware of
the need to also develop an accessible alternative.
Figure 4: Sample Ballot Form
The previous version of Preˆt a` Voter [3] used templates to extract the voters
choice from the ballot form. These templates specified where the candidate
boxes were, where the barcode was and how to divide the candidates boxes
into individual sections. The actuals vote was entered via a templated ‘×’
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or templated 7-segment display, depending on the type of race. This can
be seen in the sample ballot shown in Figure 4. From the initial tests
undertaken ?? it was found that users struggled to understand how to fill
in an 7-segment display and did not appreciate the importance of keeping
their marks within the template. The detection of the various parts of the
ballot form was remarkably robust, however, a new template was required
each time the ballot form changed. The process of creating the template
involved a lot of trial and error and was a time consuming process.
Figure 5: Mockup of New Ballot Form
The first modification we will make will be in how we detect the different
regions of the ballot form. Instead of using fixed templates we will use the
same techniques as those employed by Optical Mark Recognition (OMR).
14
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These are the forms, typically filled in with a pencil, that are often used
for multiple choice questionnaires, exams, or the UK National Lottery. The
location of the marks is interpreted by a set of guides around the edge.
These guides are black regions that indicate regions of interest, for example,
an area where a mark should be interpreted. We will use this technique
to designate both where the barcode is and where the voter choice regions
are. This should allow for a more robust detection of regions, which is not
affected by a voter straying outside of the box they are filling in. A mock
up of such a ballot form is shown in Figure 5.
The method for detecting a voters choice will be split into two; one for
detecting an ‘×’ and one for detecting numerical preferences. The detec-
tion of an ‘×’ is fairly straightforward and is basically a case of looking at
connected pixels within the region and determining if the four extremities
are in keeping with what you would expect to see for an ‘×’. Because the
domain is binary, there either is an ‘×’ or there is not, it is much simpler
to accurately detect. The detection of handwritten numbers is a far more
complex issue and an area of research in its own right. However, there are
some existing libraries and methods available for undertaking such a task.
There are commercial implementations, mainly from Lockheed Martin [9],
which have been widely used in US Census work for data input and the UK
Post Office for automatically sorting mail. The exact methods employed
by such commercial systems are closely guarded secrets, but a reasonable
result can be obtained through the use of equivalent open source libraries.
If the system was to be nationally rolled out the cost of using sophisticated
commercial technology will be justified and the robustness of the approach
would also increase. In this prototype an open source alternative will suffice.
Since we accept that even a commercial system is not going to be perfect,
we have to develop a fall-back procedure for when a voters handwritten
vote cannot be correctly recognised (this may rely on the voter verifying
that their choice has been correctly recognised in the case were automatic
detection of a malformed ballot is not possible - for example, the incorrect
recognition of 1 as 7 and 7 as 1 will not create a malformed ballot, but it is
incorrect). In the current Preˆt a` Voter [3] scheme the voter is asked to have
another go at filling in the ballot form, if it cannot be interpreted by the
scanner. This is reasonable when you are asking the voter to comply with
one particular way of entering the data, the 7-segment display. However,
when you are asking them to use their own handwriting there is a good
chance that it will not change drasticly between one try and another. As
such, there is a possibility of the machine never being able to recognise their
selection. We propose having a screen attached to the scanner that displays
what the scanner has recognised as the voters selection. This touch screen
would then permit the user to correct any mistakes so that the submitted
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result matched their handwritten selection. Once confirmed the vote that is
submitted is the one on the screen, with the receipt based on that data. This
avoids the bottleneck of asking for people to have another go and removes
the associated stigma that a voter may feel if their vote was not recognised
correctly.
Additionally it is our goal to remove the need to have a sheet fed scanner
during the vote capture phase and use a camera instead. The problem
with scanners is that they are slow and noisy. A camera would provide
an instantaneous capture of the form and allow the processing of it to be
dramatically sped up. However, the use of a camera instead of a scanner
makes the task of interpreting the image harder, due to an additional set of
distortions; such as light, shadow, curvature of the paper, etc.
4.2 Hybrid Touch Front-end
Whilst we feel a paper implementation is required, we recognise the lim-
itations of a purely paper based approach. In particular we are aware of
the accessibility problems associated with paper. This is compounded by
the random ordering of candidates, which prevents even the archaic acces-
sibility equipment, currently being used, from being applicable. If we were
to propose a purely paper based approach we would be in the unfortunate
situation of proposing a system that is less accessible than the current one.
This would be totally unacceptable to voters with disabilities and the sys-
tem is likely to face opposition from a number of influential charities and
pressure groups. It is therefore unlikely that we would even be able to run
a trial without addressing the accessibility issue in some way. One option
would be to produce a DRE (Direct Recording Electronic) voting type of
device. However, as we shall discuss in Section 8, we do not believe such
an approach can provide the strong security properties we desire. We have
therefore looked for a middle ground, in the form of a hybrid touch ap-
proach. This combines paper and touch sensitive equipment in an attempt
to maintain the properties of paper, whilst allowing for a wider range of
accessibility equipment to be used for actually entering the vote. In this
section we shall discuss our proposals at a high level. This is still work in
progress and as such we cannot provide the full details at this time.
4.2.1 Overview of Concept
The basic concept is to combine a paper based left-hand side with a touch
screen for the right-hand side. This concept had been discussed during the
implementation of version 1 of Preˆt a` VoterT˙he original idea was to get the
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user to align the left-hand side to a fixed screen, by way of holes in the paper
or some form of slot. However, it was considered that such an approach
was too complicated, fiddly and error prone. Additionally the difficulty
of aligning a piece of paper would be a distinct disadvantage in terms of
accessibility. The hybrid approach aims to to remove this disadvantage by
detecting the location and orientation of the left-hand side and rendering
the right-hand side in the appropriate location. Any movement to the left-
hand side will be detected and the location of the right-hand side will be
updated. When a voter wishes to cast their vote they interact with the touch
screen to make their selection. Due to the selection being made directly with
a computer, additional accessibility equipment, for example, sip and puff,
large buttons, voice, can all be supported. Additionally, automatic checks
can be made to ensure that the voters’ selection are valid, removing the need
for a fall back procedure, as is required for the paper only approach. We
also do not need the scanners or cameras to capture ballot forms. Once a
voter has interacted with the machine in the voting booth they are finished
with the voting process.
We believe there are currently two possible approaches to achieving the
hybrid paper/touch concept and we give a brief overview below.
4.2.2 Surface Computing
Surface Computing is an emerging computer interaction paradigm. The
basic idea is to make an ordinary surface, for example a table, into a multi-
touch sensitive interface that a person can interact with. Additionally the
surface can detect and interact with objects placed on it. The most promi-
nent example of Surface Computing is the Microsoft Surface, as pictured
in Figure 6. These tables are 42 by 30 inches with a height of 21 inches,
and provide a full surface experience. They are currently available at a
cost of approximately £10,000 each, although the price is expected to fall
significantly in the future.
The Microsoft Surface uses infra-red emitters and cameras to detect touches
and objects placed on the surface. A high resolution projector is used to
display a screen onto the underside of the surface, as depicted in the diagram
in Figure 7. To detect objects, Microsoft provides a type of 2D barcode called
an Identity Tag. These allow the surface cameras to both extract a 128-bit
data value from the tag as well as calculate its location and orientation.
We would print such an Identity Tag onto the underside of a left-hand side
ballot paper. The Identity Tag would contain the serial number of the ballot
and therefore allow the vote to be submitted. When the left-hand side is
placed onto the surface the software automatically provides the location and
17
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Figure 6: Photo of Microsoft Surface (Image from [18])
Figure 7: Diagram of Surface Computer (Diagram from [19])
orientation and we can then render the right-hand side in the appropriate
location.
There are, however, a number of disadvantages to the Surface. Firstly,
the cost and size of the surface is not very practical. It could potentially
be impractical for some disabled users (for example, wheelchair users) to
interact with a surface. There is a security concern over having cameras in
such close proximity to where someone is voting. Although we believe these
concerns can be addressed. There is also some concern about whether the
accuracy of the location and orientation detection is good enough.
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4.2.3 3M Multi-touch
An alternative approach maybe the use of the 3M M2256PW Multi-touch
screen. This is a new touch screen that provides detection of 20 simultane-
ous touch contacts. Unlike the Microsoft Surface it does not use cameras to
detect the touches. Instead it uses a technique known as Projected Capaci-
tance. This relies on the human body’s natural ability to act as a capacitor
to detect when it is within close proximity to the screen.
The concept would involve placing foil or similar material, on the underside
of the left-hand side to simulate human touch points. We would then use
these touch points to detect the location and orientation or the left-hand
side on the screen and render the right-hand side in the appropriate location.
We would also aim to be encode the serial number using multiple simulated
touch points. If this is not possible we would need to include some kind
of barcode and barcode reader to capture the ballot serial number. The
advantage of this approach over the Microsoft Surface is that there are no
cameras and therefore the security implications are reduced. The disadvan-
tage of this approach is in finding an appropriate material that will simulate
human touches on the screen. We had hoped this would be a simple case of
using some form of conductive material, however, initial tests indicate it will
require a more complicated approach. Primarily we believe it will require
a form of capacitor to act as each touch point. This may not be as bad a
problem as it seems, since a simple capacitor can be made by sandwiching
a piece of paper between two pieces of foil. The difficulty will be finding
the appropriate material that will match the capacitance properties of the
human body.
5 Cryptographic Design
5.1 Public Key Encryption Schemes Considered
In end-to-end verifiable voting systems, the voter’s vote is normally an en-
cryption of her intention and the tallying phase involves decrypting these
votes in a way that the voter-vote relationships is kept secret. Therefore, the
encryption scheme is one of the fundamental components in voting systems.
We first provide a brief overview of the the various choices of encryption
schemes we explored and the reasoning behind our subsequent design deci-
sions.
• RSA: Let p and q be two large primes. Let n = pq and φ = (p −
1)(q − 1). We first select a random value e, such that 1 < e < φ and
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gcd(e, φ) = 1. Then by applying the extended Euclidean algorithm,
we can compute a value d such that 1 < d < φ and ed ≡ 1 (mod φ).
Now, the RSA public key is (n, e) and the corresponding secret key is
d. To encrypt a plaintext m ∈ Zn, we can compute the ciphertext as
c = me (mod n). To decrypt c, the party who knows the secret key d
can compute cd = med = mkφ+1 = m (mod n). The value e is usually
fixed at a number whose bit representation has low hamming weight.
e = 216 + 1 is usually specified in many standards and this enables
RSA encryption to be very fast.
RSA is a deterministic public-key encryption scheme. In deterministic
encryption, the same plaintext will always be encrypted to the same
ciphertext. The security of RSA is based on the hardness of factoring
products of large primes, although RSA is not known to be equivalent
to factoring. RSA does not support re-encryption and does not enjoy
the additive homomorphic property.
• ElGamal: Let p and q be two large primes such that q|p − 1. We
denote Gq as the q-order subgroup of Z∗p . Let g be a generator of Gq.
The secret key is an element x ∈ Zq and the corresponding public key
is y = gx (mod p). In the remainder of this document, when referring
to El-Gamal, we assume all arithmetic operations to be carried out
modulo p, unless otherwise stated. To encrypt a plaintext m ∈ Gq, we
choose a random blinding factor r ∈ Zq and compute the ciphertext
E(m, r) = (gr,myr). To decrypt an ElGamal ciphertext we compute
m = myr/(gr)x.
ElGamal is a probabilistic public-key encryption scheme, which is se-
mantically secure if the decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption
holds in the group Gq. In contrast to deterministic encryption, the
same plaintext can be encrypted to different ciphertexts using proba-
bilistic encryption.
Working in small subgroups enables the speeding up of El-Gamal oper-
ations as the exponents are now bounded by the size of the subgroup.
It is important to choose both p and q approriately and guidelines can
be found in NIST and ECrypt recommendations on key sizes.
A distributed variant of El-Gamal is known. In a distributed scheme,
a number of parties jointly generate the system-wide public key. To
decrypt, each party submits a partial decryption and a proof of de-
cryption and these partial decryptions are combined to produce the
plaintext. In a thresholded scheme, as long as a number of decryp-
tion shares, above a certain threshold are available, decryption can be
performed, and it provides better guarantees against non-cooperating
parties.
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• Paillier: Let n be an RSA modulus n = pq, where p and q are large
primes. Let g be an integer of order a multiple of n modulo n2. The
public key is (g, n), and the secret key λ = lcm((p − 1), (q − 1)).
To encrypt a message m ∈ Zn, we randomly choose x ∈ Z∗n and
compute the ciphertext c = gmxn (mod n2). To decrypt c, we com-
pute m = L(cλ mod n2)/L(gλ mod n2) (mod n), where the L-function
takes input values from the set Sn = {u < n2|u = 1 (mod n)} and
computes L(u) = (u− 1)/n.
Paillier semantically secure under the Decision Composite Residuosity
Assumption. It is also an (additive) homomorphic encryption scheme
that supports efficient decryption. A variant of El-Gamal, known as
exponential El-Gamal in the literature also facilitates an additive ho-
momorphism, but the decryption step is inefficient.
The Generalized Pailler scheme is a variant of Pailler that supports
larger plaintexts. Threhold versions of both Paillier and Generalized
versions are known.
Although optimizations are possible, Paillier is more computationally
intensive compared to RSA and El-Gamal due to the larger size of the
exponents and modulus size, for similar security levels.
We have implemented the following encryption schemes as part of our crypto
library.
• The Paillier Encryption scheme.
• The Generalized Paillier scheme.
• A threshold version of the Generalized Paillier scheme, with a trusted
dealer (courtesy of Mads Jurik)
• The El-Gamal scheme over the following groups
– Groups based on Safe Primes i.e. p = 2.q + 1
– Groups based on Schnorr Primes i.e. p = k.q + 1
– Elliptic Curve groups standardized by NIST and provided by the
Bouncy Castle Crypto Library
• Distributed versions of the El-Gamal scheme over each of the groups
mentioned above. We hope to implement a Thresholded version in due
course.
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5.2 Design Decisions
Votes must be secure for the lifetime of the voter and therefore, at the very
least, a 128-bit security level is required. Based on NIST recommendations,
for the 128-bit security level, a 3072-bit modulus is required for RSA and
Paillier. For the discrete logarithm setting (El-Gamal), a 3072-bit prime
order group with a 256-bit prime order subgroup are required. In addition,
we must use a hash function with a 256-bit output space e.g. SHA-256.
Based on ECRYPT-II recommendations, for the 128-bit security level, we
require a 3248-bit modulus for RSA and Paillier, and a 3248-bit prime order
group with a 256-bit prime order subgroup for the discrete logarithm setting.
Conservatively, we tested RSA, Paillier, and a thresholded version of the
Generalized Paillier scheme with a 4096-bit modulus, and ElGamal with
4096-bit prime order group and 256-bit prime order subgroup. The following
table provides a very brief summary of our initial test results:
RSA ElGamal Paillier Threshold Paillier
Encryption 0.01 s 0.25 s 12 s 12 s
Re-encryption 0.2 s 6 s 6 s
Decryption 0.3 s 0.1 s 6 s 40 s
Exponent size 17-bit, 4096-bit 256-bit 4096-bit 4096-bit
Mod size 4096-bit 4096-bit 8192-bit 8192 bit
Currently, the code is written in Java and makes heavy use of the Java
BigInteger class. We are aware that the speeds can be improved significantly,
for example by using the GMP library in C, aggressive optimizations and
specialized hardware, but our tests still provide a good guide as to the
computational cost of each of these schemes.
Although we could in principle implement a scheme based on homomorphic
encryption, our tests indicate that there are likely to be significant issues
with the speeds of these crypto systems. Unfortunately, the Paillier cipher
seems to be many orders of magnitude more computationally expensive than
RSA and El-Gamal for similar security levels. The complexity increases fur-
ther when we consider thresholding. There are other difficulties surrounding
schemes based on homomorphic techniques as discussed earlier and we have
decided for the time being to avoid schemes based on homomorphic encryp-
tion and homomorphic tabulation.
This leaves us with a mixnet based approach. We have two choices for
mixnets: decryption mixnets based on RSA and re-encryption mixnets based
on ElGamal. Compared with decryption mixnets, re-encryption mixnets
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enjoy several advantages: firstly, they are more robust. The mix servers that
perform the shuﬄe only need to know the public key. If some of them are
absent, they can simply be ignored and replaced with other mixes. On the
other hand, in decryption mixnets, a single absent mix server will make the
entire mixing process stop. Secondly, using Randomised Partial Checking
(RPC) [13] to audit the mixnets, decryption mixnets can only be audited
once. Re-encryption mixnets can be audited a number of times in parallel.
For the reasons stated above, we have decided to base our design around
the El-gamal cipher and re-encryption mixnets.
5.3 Distributed El-Gamal
We describe a Distributed version of the El-Gamal cryptosystem attributed
to Brands [4, 8]. We first describe two proofs of knowledge required by the
scheme and then describe the Distributed El-Gamal scheme in the following
sections.
5.3.1 Proof of Knowledge of Discrete Logarithm
This is an interactive proof due to Schnorr [22] where a Prover P convinces
a Verifier V that for some public input (h, v) with v = hx (mod p), that he
has knowledge of the discrete logarithm x, without revealing it.
1. P: Randomly chooses a value z ∈ Zq, and sends a = hz (mod p) to V.
2. V: Sends a random challenge c ∈ Zq back to P.
3. P: Computes r = (z + c.x) (mod q), and sends r to V.
4. V: Accepts the proof if hr = a.vc (mod p).
The interactive proof described above can be made non-interactive using the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic as follows.
P executes the following steps.
1. Randomly chooses a value z ∈ Zq.
2. Computes a = hz (mod p).
3. Computes challenge c as c = Hash(v, a) (mod q).
4. Computes r = (z + c.x) (mod q)
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5. Sends KnowDL(h, v) = (a, c, r) to V.
V accepts the proof if Hash(v, a) = c and hr = a.vc (mod p).
5.3.2 Proof of Equality of Discrete Logarithms
This is an interactive proof due to Chaum and Pederson [7] where a Prover
P convinces a Verifier V that for some public inputs (f, h, v, w), v = fx
(mod p) and w = hx (mod p). i.e. that the discrete logarithm of v with
base f is equal to the discrete logarithm of w with base h, without revealing
x.
1. P: Randomly chooses a value z ∈ Zq, and sends a = fz (mod p) and
b = hz (mod p) to V.
2. V: Sends a random challenge c ∈ Zq back to P.
3. P: Computes r = (z + c.x) (mod q), and sends r to V.
4. V: Accepts the proof if f r = a.vc (mod p) and hr = a.vc (mod p).
The interactive proof described above can be made non-interactive using the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic as follows.
P executes the following steps.
1. Randomly chooses a value z ∈ Zq.
2. Computes a = fz (mod p) and b = hz (mod p) to V.
3. Computes challenge c as c = Hash(v, w, a, b) (mod q).
4. Computes r = (z + c.x) (mod q)
5. Sends EqDL(f, h, v, w) = (a, b, c, r) to V.
V accepts the proof if Hash(v, w, a, b) = c and f r = a.vc (mod p) and hr =
a.wc (mod p).
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5.3.3 Key Generation
We will assume there are n Tellers that participate in the key generation
process. They all use the same system-wide parameters (p, q, g). At the
end of the Key Generation phase, each teller Ti will generate and publish a
public key share yi along with a Proof of Knowledge of the corresponding
private key share to the BB. The Tellers keep the private key share secret.
Finally, the public key shares are used to generate a system-wide El-Gamal
public key.
Each Teller Ti performs the following steps.
• Chooses xi ← Z∗q ; Sets yi = gxi (mod p). The public key share is yi
and the corresponding private key share is xi.
• Publishes Hash(yi) as a commitment and waits till commitments are
posted by all other Tellers.
• When all commitments are available, reveals yi and KnowDL(g, yi)
• When all public key shares are posted, verifies all commitments and
proofs. If any of the commitments or proofs fail, the process must be
repeated.
Finally, any party can generate the system-wide El-Gamal public key as
Y =
∏
i yi (mod p)
5.3.4 Encryption
The plaintext space of the El-Gamal cryptosystem is the set Zq and the
message space is the q-order subgroup of Z∗p . Plaintexts must be encoded
into the message space before encryption and must be decoded back to after
decryption. There are efficient encoding and decodings known for the case
when p = 2.q + 1.
We would like to work in groups with p = k.q + 1 where q is small. For
the 128 bit security level, NIST recommends a 3072 bit p and 256 bit q.
However, encoding and decoding messages from Zq to the q-order subgroup
is still an open problem in this case. This is not a problem in our scheme as
the Election Manager publishes a mapping of candidate names to elements
of the subgroup at the start of the election.
To encrypt a message m ∈ Z∗q with the system-wide public-key Y ,
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• Choose r ← Z∗q
• Output C = (G,M) = (gr (mod p),m.Y r (mod p))
5.3.5 Distributed Decryption
To decrypt a ciphertext C encrypted with the system-wide public key Y ,
each Teller performs the following steps using its private key share xi
• Publishes the partial decryption ci = Gxi (mod p)
• Publish EqDL(g,G, yi, ci)
When all partial decryptions are available, a combiner (or indeed, any party)
can recover the plaintext by performing the following steps
• Verify all proofs.
• If all proofs are OK, then compute m = M/(∏i ci) (mod p)
5.4 Verifiable Shuﬄe and Randomised Partial Checking
In a verifiable shuﬄe, a mix server receives a batch of ciphertexts, re-encrypts
each ciphertext and then outputs the results in a random order. She also
publishes some proof so that the correctness of the shuﬄe can be publicly
verified, but the proof should not reveal the relationship between the inputs
and the outputs. The Randomised Partial Checking (RPC) can be used to
generate such a proof in an intuitive way.
Suppose A is a batch of ciphertexts received by a mix server, and B is the
output batch. To prove that B is the correct shuﬄe of A. The mix server
could perform as follows:
1. The mix server generates three other batches of ciphertexts, denoted
as X , Y and Z, where each batch is an independent shuﬄe of A. She
inserts these three batches betweenA and B. This is pictured in Figure
8.
2. For the batch X , the auditor randomly assigns half of the ciphertexts L
and the other half R. For ciphertexts assigned L, the mix server reveals
their incoming links (from A) as well as the randomisation values used
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Figure 8: Randomised Partial Checking
for re-encryption. Similarly, for ciphertexts assigned R, the mix server
reveals their outgoing links (to Y) as well as the randomisation values
used for re-encryption.
3. In the batch Y, for exactly half of the ciphertexts, their incoming links
have already been revealed. We denote that these ciphertexts are in
the group G1 while other ciphertexts are in the group G2. Then the
auditor randomly assigns half of ciphertexts in G1 and half of the
ciphertexts in G2 and requires the mix server to reveal their outgoing
links (to Z) as well as the randomisation values used for re-encryption.
4. In the last shuﬄe from Z to B, for the ciphertexts whose incoming
links have not been revealed, the mix server reveals their outgoing
links as well as the randomisation values used for re-encryption.
5. Since the mix server knows how the batch A has been shuﬄed into
the other batches, she will also know how the other batches can shuﬄe
between each other. Therefore, the mix server is able to reveal all
the required links as well as their randomisation values. Finally, for
all these revealed links, the auditor can re-compute the re-encryptions
using the revealed randomisation values and check whether the mix
server has correctly performed the shuﬄe.
The security of the above protocol has been proved in [11]: although half
of the links have been revealed and audited, no information will be leaked
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Figure 9: Flowchart of Design
that how B is shuﬄed from A. Note that the proof can be made non-
interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristics [10], and we can repeat the
above procedures a number of times to achieve high level of assurance.
6 Implementation Details
Figure 9 gives a high level overview of the components and flows of data
between them. This section will provide an explanation of the functions
performed by each of the components. This is intended to complement Sec-
tion 3 which gives the view of the system from the perspective of the tasks
performed by the voter. As the components and tasks are not isolated, but
depend intricately on tasks performed by other components some informa-
tion may be duplicated to faciliate presentation.
Information will be added to this document as when they are decided.
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6.1 Election Manager
6.1.1 Bootstrapping the Election
Prior to the start of the election, the list of candidates contesting is an-
nounced. The Election manager (EM) is then entrusted with bootstrapping
the election process. It will also publish a set of global system parame-
ters (p, q, g) as described earlier in Section 5. It will publish a mapping of
candidate names to elements of the group Z∗q .
All parties, including the EM, the booths and the Bulletin Board (BB), will
generates signing/verification key-pairs which are published to the BB and
appropriately certified.
The system parameters are used by the Tellers in the key generation process.
Each Teller generates an El-Gamal public/private key-share and posts the
public key shares along with a Proof of Knowledge of the corresponding
secret key to the EM’s website.
Once public key shares have been posted by all Tellers to the EM’s web-site,
the EM will combine the public key shares to generate a system-wide public
key. Anyone can look at public key shares and verify that this system-
wide public key has been generated properly by verifying the proofs and
recreating the system wide public key themselves.
6.1.2 Ballot Generation
The EM is responsible for constructing enough ballots to cater for the elec-
torate and sufficient random audits of ballots. The EM uses the public
data on the bulletin board to generate the Preˆt a` Voter style ballots i.e.
ballots with randomized candidate lists, pure El-Gamal encryptions of the
group elements corresponding to each of the candidates and a ballot serial
number (BSN) which is computed as a hash of the ballot ciphertexts and
serves both to look up a specific ballot on the bulletin board and to provide
an integrity check of the ciphertext ordering. In contrast to schemes based
on homomorphic tallying, we do not require ZKP’s as part of the ballot
information.
In the academic literature, it is mentioned that the ciphertexts are printed
on the right-hand side of the ballot. However, we believe this is cumbersome
given the total size of these ciphertexts. For a 4096-bit p and 256-bit q, for
a ballot with 5 candidates, the data size for the onions in each ballot will be
around 5 KB. We suggest that the onions are published on the BB, and the
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paper ballot only contains the candidate list as well as a unique BSN which
can be used to look up the ballot on the BB. This is pictured in Figure 10.
The Election Manager must securely deliver the ballot serial numbers and
corresponding candidate orderings to the printers. In addition, it must also
publish to the bulletin board, the serial numbers and the ciphertexts corre-
sponding to the RHS onto the BB.
Ideally, the Election Manager should run the ballot generation task on disk
less workstations in a physically secure location, booting off from a “live”
certified disk. This will provide protection against kleptographic attacks
and prevent the randomness used in the encryptions from being leaked.
The Election Manager should perform these tasks under observation, and
the workstations should be destroyed after the ballot generation phase to
protect against any information leakage.
Figure 10: The ballot. (a) The ballot data on the BB. (b) The ballot form
6.2 Tellers
6.2.1 Key Generation
As already described, Tellers participate in the key generation and are re-
sponsible for generating public/private key shares. They post the public
key shares along with proofs of knowledge of the corresponding private key
shares to the Election Manager’s web site and keep the private key shares
secret. The public key shares are used to create the system-wide public key.
The corresponding system-wide private key does not exist as such, but exists
as shares with the tellers.
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6.2.2 Mixing and Ballot Tallying
Once the voting phase is over the encrypted votes are mixed and posted to
the bulletin board, the Tellers then tally the votes to generate the election
outcome. Note that the mixing can be done by the tellers themselves or by
independent parties. The exact details of the vote capture, mixing and tal-
lying depend on the election method used and the details for FPTP and AV
are described below. The main task performed by the Tellers during tallying
is to produce partial decryptions of ciphertexts which are accompanied by
proofs of correctness.
In both FPTP and AV elections, the received votes will be shuﬄed by mix
servers and then they will be decrypted by the tellers. The main difference
between tallying FPTP and AV is that in AV tallying, the process may take
several rounds.
• FPTP tallying: When all votes are received, the ciphertext corre-
sponding to the choice in each ballot is extracted and posted to a sec-
tion of the bulletin board. This section represents the set of encrypted
votes, ready for mixing and tallying. The first mix server downloads
these ciphertexts and shuﬄes them. It then sends the outputs of the
shuﬄe back to the BB where it is posted to another section. The next
mix server then downloads the outputs of the first mix server and im-
plements another shuﬄe and sends the outputs back to the BB and
the mix output is posted to yet another section of the BB. This pro-
cess is repeated until the received votes are shuﬄed by all mix servers.
Finally, all the tellers download the final mixed output from the BB
and each Teller partially decrypts the onions, and sends back the re-
sults to the BB which publishes all partial decryptions. These partial
decryptions can be combined by any party to reveal the plaintexts and
the tally can be computed from these plaintext votes.
• AV Tallying: In AV elections, for every cast ballot, the onions
are sorted according to the voter’s preferences. For example, the vote
in Figure 3(b) will be sorted as {θE , θD, θC , θB, θA} (note that these
θ values are ciphertexts and the subscripts are used for notational
convenience). These ciphertext tuples are now shuﬄed by the mixnets
and the output of each shuﬄe is posted to the BB. In the first round
of tallying, the threshold parties only decrypt the first onion of every
vote and it is checked if some candidate receives more votes than the
quota. If yes, the election ends and the result announced.
Otherwise, the candidate with the least votes will be eliminated, and
all votes for this candidate will be redistributed among the remaining
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candidates, based on the next preference. In every vote with a first
preference for the eliminated candidate, the first onion is removed and
the above procedures is repeated until a candidate is elected. For more
information, see [12].
The tellers will not operate as servers to minimise the security risks. Instead
they will operate as semi-autonomous units that will pull data from the
bulletin board themselves. During the tallying stage they will take a copy of
all the ciphertext votes, and then compute their respective partial decryption
and post this partial decryption and proof back to the bulletin board. When
all partial decryptions have been received, the result can be combined and
published.
6.2.3 Ballot Auditing
Ballot Auditing may be live or oﬄine. If live ballot auditing is allowed then
the Tellers must always be online and return the plaintexts corresponding
to the ballot ciphertexts for the ballot chosen for audit so that the ballot
can be reconstructed from just the right-hand side information. However,
we believe that live auditing will in general be infeasible. We anticipate that
the time taken to decrypt a number of ciphertext components by the tellers
and return the candidate ordering to the booth will be a bottleneck during
peak voting phases. We suggest an oﬄine audit whereby ballots are flagged
for audit and the Tellers decrypt these flagged ballots at a later stage and
post the decrypted ballots to the BB so that the auditing party (authority
or voter) can check that the candidate ordering matches the original printed
ballot. This has the added advantage that decryptions can be batched so
that it can be completed within the stipulated time limit. The manner in
which audit is initiated by the voter in explained in 6.5.
6.3 Mix Servers
As re-encryption mixes require no secret information, in the most general
case, we can assume that mixes and tellers are different. Each mix pulls
the relevant data from the BB, performs the mix and publishes the shuﬄed
output back to the BB along with a proof for this shuﬄe. The shuﬄe phase
can be verified by Randomised Partial Checking [13] for example.
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6.4 Printers
We anticipate that the Printers may be in a separate location to the Election
Manager. The Election Manager must securely deliver the serial number and
candidate ordering to the printer. Following the successful printing of the
ballots they must be securely stored/transmitted to the polling station. In
contrast to the current ballot forms, ballot forms in our scheme must be
stored securely so no-one can see the serial numbers and candidate names.
If someone is able to gain access to a ballot form prior to the voter who uses
it to cast a vote, the secrecy of the voter could be compromised. It is an
open question how we ensure that the printing machines do not learn the
votes. We may be left with no choice but to trust the printing service.
6.5 Polling Station
At the Polling station, we assume there are a number of scanners linked
to a local server, which communicates with the BB. The Voting process is
described in Section 3.
6.5.1 Ballot Audit
As discussed earlier, we favour an oﬄine mechanism of ballot auditing.
When a voter triggers a ballot for audit, she detaches the right-hand side
from a ballot and feeds in the unfilled left-hand side to the scanner. The
scanner scans the ballot serial number and passes the information to the lo-
cal server, which signs the BSN and relays this information to the BB. The
BB flags the ballot with this serial number for audit. The BB then signs the
BSN and sends the signature back to the local server. The scanner/printer
is now instructed to print “void” on the ballot, as well as the signature re-
turned from the BB. The voter now takes away this signed right-hand side
as well as the corresponding left-hand side.
6.5.2 Vote Casting
When a voter decides to cast a voter, she fills in the right-hand side as
instructed, then detaches the left-hand side and destroys it. The signed
BSN and scanned right-hand side information is passed to the BB by the
local server. The scanned right-hand side is published by the BB to a section
of received votes. The BB signs the BSN, and this is returned to the local
server, which instructs the scanner/printer to print this information on the
right-hand side. The voter takes away this signed right-hand side.
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Suitable methods should be employed so that the BB can be assured that
requests for audits and scanned cast ballots are coming from legitimate
polling stations and not from malicious parties. Likewise, the polling station
should be assured that the information it receives back is in fact from the BB
and not from a malicious third party. This can be achieved via appropriate
use of digital signatures. While end-to-end encryption is not required for
communication between the BB and polling stations, we recommend this is
in fact used as best practice.
The actual process of handling voters and checking their right to vote is
not part of our system. However, UK law requires the recording of a ballot
serial number next to each voter for fraud protection reasons. As such, we
will need the capability to provide the information required for this list,
even though it will not form a component within our system. How the vote
is cast may impact on this, for example, in an all electronic scheme with
a touch screen we may need to record this list digitally before providing a
paper report at the close of the election. The list is held securely by a Legal
Guardian, again this is not our responsibility and is included in the diagram
for completeness.
6.6 Bulletin Board
The BB is perhaps the most crucial component in our system. The bulletin
board plays an integral role within the election system. The exact design of
the bulletin board is still being looked at. Initially it will be some form of
redundant server system providing a mirrored database.
The bulletin board will hold the initial ballots generated by the EM. During
the actual voting phase, the BB will receive the votes as they come in from
the polling station and return a signed receipt to the booth to provide the
voter with proof that the vote was successfully submitted. It is vital that
the bulletin board stays online and available for as much of the election
as possible. Once the election has finished the bulletin board will receive
all outputs from mixes and then, the decrypted shares from the tellers and
combine them. Finally, it will then publish the final result.
The BB must be divided into a number of separate sections with each section
holding data pertaining to a particular stage of the voting process. We
describe these briefly below.
• Section 1: The Election Manager generates the ballots and sends the
ciphertexts corresponding to the right-hand side and the BSN which is
generated as a hash of these ciphertexts to the BB. This is published in
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an initial section of the BB and must never change after it is initially
posted. The only exception to this may be an additional flag next to
each ballot, which can be used to indicate whether a ballot has been
flagged for audit.
• Section 2: Scanned ballots are posted to the BB. We note that the
scanned information will not be a pixel level scan to avoid any attacks
based on subliminal channels. Once voting is complete, this section
must be frozen.
• Section 3: A third section of the BB will hold the ciphertexs ex-
tracted from Section 1, corresponding to the vote information in Sec-
tion 2. By virtue of the fact that both Sections 1 and 2 of the BB are
frozen, this mapping of choices to ciphertexts can be publicly checked.
• Sections representing outputs of Mixes: We will assume there
are n mix servers numbered 1 through to n. There will be a section of
the BB which will hold the output of each mix. Mix 1 takes the data
from Section 3 and posts its output to the BB and subsequent mixes
pull the data from the output of the preceding mix. The output of the
final mix represents the set of encrypted ballots which will be used for
the tally.
• Sections representing the partial decryptions of the Tellers:
The tellers now each take the output of the final mix and perform a
partial decryption as mandated by the election method and post it
back to the BB. In case of AV tallying, this section may need more
fine-grained partitions to allow for multiple rounds of tallying.
• Plaintext Votes: A final section of the BB will hold the plaintext
votes obtained by combining the partial decryptions of the tellers. We
may assume there is a separate combiner, or that this task is performed
by the BB. Again, this phase can be checked by any external party,
by verifying the proofs of decryption of each teller and combining the
partial decryptions to produce the plaintexts.
7 Technologies Employed
7.1 Data Transfer - Election Mark-up Language
Where data flows between the separate components it should currently be
assumed to be in the form of XML data that complies with the OASIS
Election Mark-up Language (EML). For example, the candidate list will be
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delivered in an EML compliant format and will contain at least the candi-
date name and their party affiliation. Our aim is to fully comply with the
EML specification, however, we may find that when full implementation de-
tails become apparent we need to extend the EML specification. The reason
for using the EML is twofold. Firstly to standardise how we communicate
between components and secondly to allow cross-platform/implementation
support. In Version 1 of the implementation Java Objects were serialised
and passed around the system. This has the disadvantage of locking the im-
plementation to Java and makes updating the code much harder since strict
version control is required. The implementation we finally produce should
act as a reference implementation. A core concept is that election authori-
ties/tellers/mix servers should be free to use their own implementations. As
such, we need to ensure compatibility between components.
8 Possible Extensions
8.1 Pre-print/On-demand Printing Of Ballot Forms
Secrecy of the ballot relies on the fact that the list of candidates cannot be
deduced from the onion without the ability to decrypt. However, the ballot
form itself, when entire, provides an association between the onion and the
candidate list. This means that ballot forms need to be managed carefully,
and the chain of custody between the creation of a ballot form and its use
in a polling station needs to be trusted.
An alternative approach is to print ballot forms at the point they are needed.
This can be achieved by providing a ballot form with the candidate list
encrypted in two different ways: one which can be decrypted in the polling
station, and one which can be decrypted by the Preˆt a` Voter tellers as
previously. The list of candidates is then printed on demand, in the privacy
of the booth. This addresses the chain of custody issues, and provides
additional assurance to the voter that external parties cannot have seen
the candidate list associated with their particular ballot form or receipt.
Ballot forms can be audited in the same way as previously, by asking for
the candidate list associated with the right-hand side to be revealed, and
checking that it matches the left-hand side.
With the exception of having the ballot form printed on demand as a voter
wishes to vote, the voting experience—casting a vote, auditing a ballot form,
separating a ballot form into two halves, checking the vote—is identical with
the experience of using a pre-printed ballot form.
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8.2 Ballot Audit
A neat way to reveal the audit information and enforce the requirement that
an audited ballot not be used subsequently to cast a vote is the Scratch &
Vote scheme due to Adida and Rivest [1]. Here, a scratch strip is removed to
reveal audit information and ballots lacking the scratch strip are not scanned
into the system.
An alternative approach, due to Ryan and Schneider [20], is to print a ballot
form on each side of the ballot paper, in such a way that the removal of the
candidate list on one side does not affect the information on the other side.
The permutations on the two ballot forms must be independent. The voter
chooses one side of the ballot form arbitrarily on which to cast the vote, and
marks her vote in the usual way, and detaches the list of candidates so that
the vote can be cast. The other side still constitutes a complete ballot form,
and can be audited, checking that the decrypted candidate list corresponds
to the printed candidate list.
8.3 DRE Interface
As was mentioned in Section 4, a DRE front-end has been considered. A
simple touch screen interface without any external paper provides both the
simplest and most accessible front-end. However, there are a number of
compromises that must be made to the properties of the election system
in order to include a DRE. Firstly, and most obviously, the privacy of the
voters vote. If you cast your vote via a DRE the DRE will learn how
you voted. Therefore, the voter must trust the DRE, and by definition the
custodians and manufacturers of the DRE, with their privacy. This may well
be acceptable to the general public, who during our focus group sessions ??
indicated privacy was a fairly low priority to them. However, the fact that
the DRE controls both the display and recording of a voters choice presents
a far bigger security concern, impacting the integrity of the election [14].
Due to the DRE being able to instantaneously alter what is displayed on
the screen it is very difficult to provide assurance that the candidate list is
in fact correct. For example, the DRE could switch two candidates around
on the screen. The voter casts their vote, get their receipt and everything
appears to be correct. However, the voter has in fact voted for someone else.
The only way to avoid this is to force the DRE to commit to the left-hand
side. However, this clearly cannot be printed out and kept by the voter
because that would allow them to prove how they voted. The voter needs
some way of leaving the polling station with a commitment of the candidate
ordering that was displayed on the screen and a way to prove if the DRE
manipulated it, without also being able to reveal the candidate ordering.
37
Project Reference: Trustworthy Voting Systems TVS-SUR-TR-05
This strikes us as infeasible. Some remote voting schemes have attempted
to achieve this, through a combination of auditing on multiple machines
and giving the voter freedom to vote on any machine. This clearly is not an
option in a polling station where the choice of machine is limited, or non-
existent, and the voter can only take a minimum amount of information
away with them (anything that can be printed onto a receipt). We will
continue to investigate the use of a DRE, but currently we do not have a
solution that does not involve some form of pre-printed ballot commitment
that can be used to ensure the DRE is honest.
9 Conclusion
Although many theoretical papers exist, one of the major challenges and
criticisms with end-to-end verifiable voting schemes has been the absence of
complete details from an implementation point of view [14]. This document
attempts to fill this gap between the theory of voting and the actual intrica-
cies that only become apparent when an implementation is considered with
a view to being practical and usable in the real world with various practical,
legal and social constraints. This document is far from complete and we
will be updating it as the project progresses, but we hope it will provide an
insight into the gap between the theory and practice on end-to-end voting
schemes.
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Appendix
Electoral Practices in the UK
The United Kingdom is divided into 650 constituencies and each constituency
elects one Member of Parliament to represent them in the UK parliament.
In the 2010 UK general election, around 30 million voters voted in total in
the 650 constituencies.
The First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) election method is used in the current UK
general elections. Voters cast their votes using paper ballots. The ballot lists
the name of each candidate along with their party name and party logo. To
cast a vote, the voter puts a cross next to his or her preferred candidate,
and the candidate with the most votes is elected. Note that this candidate
does not need to get more than half of the votes. If there is a tie, the winner
is selected by the draw of lots.
A referendum has been proposed to decide whether to replace the FPTP
system with the Alternative Vote (AV) system. In AV, the ballot lists the
name of each candidate along with their party name and party logo. To cast
a vote, the voter gives a preference ranking of some or all of the candidates.
The winner is determined by a quota, which is normally half of the received
votes. In the first round of tallying, only the first preference of every ballot
is taken into account. If some candidate receives more votes than the quota,
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the candidate wins and the election ends. Otherwise, the candidate with the
least votes is eliminated and all ballots with the highest preference for this
voter are redistributed among the remaining candidates, based on the next
preference. In case the next preference is empty or all the remaining prefer-
ences are for eliminated candidates, the ballot is discarded. The process is
repeated until a winner is found.
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